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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANA PHELPS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
SOCIAL SERVICE AND CHILD WELFARE DEPARTMENT OF THE RELIEF SOCIETY GENERAL BOARD
ASSOCIATION OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER - DAY
SAINTS,

Case No.

10892

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action praying for a Writ of Habeas Cor±ms
commanding the Defendant to return control and custodl". of
r
an infant child.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From an Order, Judgment and Decree for the Defendant, Plaintiff appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment
in her favor as a matter of law ordering the return of custody and control of said infant child and quieting to her all
righ, title, interest or claim to said infant, or that failing, a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 17, 1966, Plaintiff gave birth to an infant.
(R. 47) Plaintiff was an unwed mother; she has never been
married nor has she ever been pregnant before. (R. 41) She

conceived in early March, 1966, but did not become aware
of her pregnant condition until the last week of August,
1966. (R. 41; Exhibit 2-P, "Prenatal Record;" R. 40)
Her pregnancy was discovered upon examination by a
brother, who was a doctor. Upon discovery he immediately
demanded that she leave the small Utah town in which they
were joint residents, (R. 42) and that she place the child,
when born, for adoption. (R. 42, 115) Another member of
the family, a sister, also persisted in this advice. (R. 115)
Plaintiff did leave the area, and upon arrival in Salt
Lake City, checked in at the University Hospital and was
seen by Dr. Hebertson, who became her attending physician.
Dr. Herbertson also suggested that she place the child for
adoption stating that it would not be right for her to raise
the child by herself, and without a father for the child, that
it would be socially wrong. (R. 41, 44) Plaintiff's first visit
with Dr. Hebertson was on September 1, 1966. (R. 107) On
the first visit, in addition to the suggestion for placing the
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child, Dr. Hebertson also discussed with Plaintiff the various
adoption agencies licensed in Utah. ( R. 109) Plaintiff visited with Dr. Hebertson in his office on ten more occasions before the birth of the baby. Whenever the baby was
discussed, the doctor repeated his advice that the baby be
placed for adoption. ( R. 115)

In connection with a possible adoption, Dr. Hebertson
referred Plaintiff to a social worker attached to the University Hospital, a Mrs. Bridgewater. (R. 116, 143) Plaintiff
visited in Mrs. Bridgewater's office and on that occasion the
matter of adoption was discussed. ( R. 143) Plaintiff also
indicated to Mrs. Bridgewater that the costs would be a
problem and that she would have to have help in paying the
hospital and doctor bills. Mrs. Bridgewater, by telephone,
made an appointment for Plaintiff with a Mrs. Stewart at
the Defendant Agency to discuss adoption proceedings. On
September 28, 1966, Plaintiff met with Mrs. Stewart. On
that occasion, Mrs. Stewart gave Plaintiff the "benefit of
my experience" to the effect that it was to the Plaintiff's
advantage to place the child for adoption (R. 92) and that
this would be the right thing to do. (R. 47) Plaintiff did not
sPe Mrs. Stewart again until the day after the birth of the
child. ( R. 93) Mrs. Stewart did not explain or discuss any
help whi'ch might be available to Plaintiff if she decided to
keep the child. (R. 104) In discussing the mechanics of an
adoption, Mrs. Stewart did indicate that as the hospital holds
the baby for at least four days after birth, she would wait
for two or three days after the birth of the baby before
securing the consent so as to be sure that Plaintiff was not
under the influence of any anaesthetic. (R. 51)
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Prior to her conversation with her doctor brother and
Dr. Hebertson, Plaintiff had not considered placing her baby
for adoption. ( R. 55) There is no evidence that she ever
unequivocally determined to do so. (R. 63) When querried
on the subject she only replied that Dr. Hebertson felt it was
for the best. ( R. 66)
On December 15 at about 9 :30 p.m. Plaintiff's membranes ruptured and she went to the hospital. She was sent
home and told to return when the labor pains started. At
approximately 3 :00 a.m. the next morning (December 16)
irregular contractions began and at 4 :30 a.m. she was admitted to the hospital. (Exhibit 2-P, "Inpatient Admission
Record"; Ibid, "Staff Notes") On admittance she appeared
"apprehensive and very quiet." (Ibid. "Nurses Notes"
and Observations") She continued with irregular, hard contractions until noon. By that time she was complaining bitterly with pain. (lbit 1• "Staff Notes") Beginning at noon
a very vigorous attempt at stimulation of labor was made.
(Ibid.) At ~ :45 p.m. Plaintiff was very upset and crying.
(Ibid. "Nurses Notes and Observations"') Finally at 5 :00
p.m. it was decided to rest Plaintiff because she had had a
fatiguing day, and she was sedated for the night. ( R. 117)
She slept intermittently with periodic contractions. (Ibid.)
On the following morning (December 17) it was concluded
that Plaintiff vmuld not deliver normally and that it would
be necessary to take the child by Caeserian section. (R. 61)
During that morning Plaintiff was kept under sedation with
various drugs, (Ibid. "Nurses Notes and Observations)
and at 1 :45 p.m. the delivery procedure was begun. At 2 :07
the infant was born and at 3 :20 p.m. Plaintiff was returned
to the ward "apprehensive." (Ibid.) Medication was re-
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sumed at 3 :30 p.m. and among other drugs she was given
Vistaril, a narcotic. At 6 :45 p.m. she was given Demora!,
another narcotic. At 2 :30 a.m. the following morning (December 18) she was given another dosage of Demora!. Again
at 9 :40 a.m. another dosage of Demora! was given.
During the morning of December 18, Plaintiff was
crying "off and on," was having a "severe headache" and
abnormal discomfort. (Ibid. "Nurses Notes and Observations") At approximately 1 :00 p.m. a sister, Barbara, came
to visit with Plaintiff. (R. 63) The nurse on duty, Mrs.
Jerominski told Barbara Plaintiff was under sedation and
needed rest. ( R. 65, 138) Barbara stayed with Plaintiff until approximately 3 :05 p.m., during which period both were
crying. (R. 64, 132) There was little conversation between
the two women because Plaintiff didn't seem to know the
sister was there, wasn't really coherent, and "just wasn't
like herself." (R. 63, 66)
At 3 :05 a brother, Bill, came to visit Plaintiff and
Barbara left. (R. 64) Bill attempted to discuss the adoption
of the baby but likewise found it difficult to visit with Plaintiff. She had a very vague appearance, apparently not knowing whether it was morning or afternoon, and repeatedly
asked the time of day. (R. 69) Bill was in the room about
five minutes when Mrs. Stewart from Defendant Agency
arrived. When Mrs. Stewart entered the room Bill left, remaining outside in the hallway for approximately 35 minutes
until Mrs. Stewart left, and then reentering the room. While
waiting in the hall he heard Mrs. Stewart explain to Plaintiff that she was there to have the papers signed, but he did
not hear any reply from Plaintiff. (R. 70) Bill claims that
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as Mrs. Stewart left the room she said to him, "I have
Dana's signature on the paper. For a minute I didn't think
she would sign, but I finally got her signature." (R. 71)
Mrs. Stewart recalled the conversation but denies that she
said "I was afraid that she wouldn't sign. . . " (R. 107)
When Bill returned to the room Plaintiff appeard very depressed and crying. Finding it impossible to carry on a conversation with her, he left the room in approximately 10
minutes.
The last thing Plaintiff remembers prior to the birth
of the baby is a visit from Dr. Hebertson in her room at
which time he said " ... we are going to take the baby tomorrow at 1 :00 o'clock." Her first recollection after the
birth of the child is a vague awareness of her brother Bill
sitting by her bedside. She does not remember the visit with
her sister Barbara nor the visit with Mrs. Stewart. The next
thing the Plaintiff remembers after the visit with her
brother Bill is a visit from Dr. Hebertson which she thought
was the following day. (R. 49-50)
Mrs. Stewart called Plaintiff by telephone at the hospital on December 17, following delivery, explaining that
she would come the following day to secure the consent to
the adoption. (R. 94-100) Plaintiff does not remember this
call. When Mrs. Stewart visited with Plaintiff on the 18th,
Plaintiff appeared to recognize her immediately and this
was surprising to Mrs. Stewart because they had met only
once before. It did not appear to Mrs. Stewart that Plaintiff
had been crying but she did start crying while Mrs. Stewart
was in the room and was crying when Mrs. Stewart left.
(R. 100) Mrs. Stewart discussed the release form and in-
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structed Plaintiff as to how to fill in and sign her name,
which she did while Mrs. Stewart was in the room. (R. 96)
Mrs. Stewart recalls that Plaintiff remarked prior to signing the release, "Yes, I might as well do it now." (R. 96,
105) Plaintiff seemed responsive to Mrs. Stewart. (R. 96)
Nurse Jerominski attended Plaintiff on December 18
from approximately 9 :00 a.m. to 2 :30 p.m. (R. 130) During
this time Plaintiff was very cooperative, nice and did everything asked by Mrs. Jerominski, though crying off and on.
(R. 131) Dr. Hebertson visited plaintiff on December 18 at
approximately 8 :00 a.m. but did not see her again until
6: 10 p.m. ( R. 121, 122)
The infant was never shown to Plaintiff and was taken
from the hospital by Mrs. Stewart on December 21. (R. 98)
The infant was placed by Defendant Agency with third persons on December 22. (R. 97) The Plaintiff was released
from the hospital on December 23. (R. 51)
On December 31, 1966, eight days after being released from the hospital, Plaintiff contacted the doctor
in regard getting the infant back. (R. 51) She conferred
with him but he advised her nothing could be done. On
January 5, 1967, contact was made with the worker of Defendant Agency for the same purpose and Plaintiff was
advised to get an attorney and discuss the matter with
him. (R 106). On January 9, 1967, 23 days after the birth
of the child, petition for writ of Habeas Corpus was filed.
(R. 1-3)
The identity of the persons with whom the baby was
placed by Defendant Agency was not revealed at the time
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of trial and no evidence was proferred as to said persons.
It was acknowledged by counsel for Defendant Agency
that as of the date of trial no petition for adoption had
been filed by said persons.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT INQUIRY IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING REGARDING CUSTODY OF CHILDREN IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE; THIS BEING
SO THE APPELLATE COURT MAY REVIEW
QUESTIONS OF BOTH LAW AND FACT, AND
ENTER SUCH A DECREE AS JUSTICE REQUIRES.
At the trial of this matter counsel for the Defendant
moved to strike paragraph 7 of the complaint, on the
ground that in a habeas corpus proceeding the only thing
before the Court is legality of restraint. ( R. 35) The Court
denied the motion and rightly so. However, we feel constrained to reargue the point because of the significance
thereof and as prologue to the ensuing Points of this Brief.
Rule 72, URCP, provides that "In equity cases the
appeal may be on questions of both law and fact."
Admittedly, the prevailing approach seems to consider a habeas corpus proceeding on the law side of the
court. (5 Am. Jur. 2d, APPEAL AND ERROR, Section
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871) However, where the custody of children is involved
a different approach has been taken by our Court. In the
case of Jones 1·s. Moore, et al, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191
(1923) Justice Frick stated:

"While it is true that the proceeding, in form at
least, is habeaus corpus proceeding, it is, however, so
merely as a matter of convenience to the parties and
to expedite a hearing upon the issues. No case involving the custody of minor children has ever been
tried or considered in this jurisdiction as merely a
habeas corpus proceeding, although the case in form
is such. In habeas corpus proceedings nothing is
inquired into except the legality of the restraint,
and if it be found that the petitioner is illegally deprived of his liberty, but one conclusion is permissible, and that is that the same must be restored to
him. Where, as here, however, the sole issue involved is who shall have the custody, care and education of a child, and especially one of tender years
the inquiry extends far beyond the ordinary issues
involved in a habeas corpus proceeding. Cases like
the one at bar partake of all of the incidents of a
proceeding in equity. Indeed, under our procedure,
-- it has become a proceeding which is equitable in the
highest degree, as clearly appears from the decisions
in all of the cases decided by this court, where the
right to the custody, nurture, care and education of
children was the controlling issue." (Cases Cited)
The same rule is adopted and discussed historically by
Justice Wade in Walton vs. Koffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P 2d
97 ( 1946), and was most recently confirmed by our Court in
the case of lt'ilson i·s. Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P. 2d
925 ( 1963), wherein Justice Crockett stated:
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"Such proceedings are equitable in nature. In fact,
because of the bearing they may have on the entire
course of the life of the child, they are sometimes
said to be equitable in the highest degree, and the
court will scrutinize the proceeding with especial
care in the interest of the child."

POINT II.
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF AT THE
TIME SHE EXECUTED THE RELEASE INSTRUMENT ASSIGNING ALL RIGHTS TO HER
INF ANT CHILD TO DEFENDANT AGENCY
HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE
AND CONSEQUENCES OF HER ACT, AND WAS
NOT ACTING UNDER ANY UNDUE INFLUENCE, RESTRAINT, MENACE, FRAUD OR
OTHER ACTION WHICH DEPRIVED HER OF
HER FREE AND VOLUNTARY ACTION IN SO
DOING.
After hearing in the trial court it was found by the
District Judge that at the time of the execution of the
Release and consent Plaintiff had full knowledge of the
nature and consequences of her act and was not acting
under any undue influence, restraint, menace, fraud or other
action which deprived her of her free and voluntary action
in so doing. (R. 20). Based on this Finding the District
Judge concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to the
custody and control of the minor child involved (R. 20)
and decreed that Plaintiff should be judically deprived of all
right in and claim to the minor child. (R. 2)
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We submit the evidence did not support a finding that
there was no undue influence and as a matter of fact the
preponderence of the evidence was directly to the contrary.
Section 78-30-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
provides:
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the
consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate
child without the consent 0f its mother, if living,
. . . ; provided, that the district court may order
the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or parents whose
consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer
authorized to take acknowledgements, released his
or her or their control or custody of such child to
any agency licensed to receive children for placement or adoption ... "
As will be argued at a later time, we question the application of said statute in the instant case insofar as the
right Plaintiff to revoke her Release is concerned, since
an adoption proceeding had not been instituted regarding
the child involved. Nevertheless, we submit this section
establishes the legislative intent that a legal and lawful
release to the child placing agency by a person competent
to make same is required before said child can be subsequently placed for adoption and the natural parent deprived
of legal rights thereto.
The type of freely given act or consent necessary by
a natural parent is defined as follows:
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"Legal consent to adoption means consent fully and
voluntarily given, and includes consent to all the
legal consequences of adoption. Legal consent does
not exist where it is obtained through fraud, duress
or other overreaching practices, or other circumstances which justify the conclusion that the consent was not fully and voluntarily given." (2 Am.
Jur. 2d, ADOPTION, Section 44; 24 ALR 2d 1127

(1952)

a. It is submitted that in the instant case Plaintiff's
consent was not freely and voluntarily given because the
release was not signed as her independent act but rather
under the cumulative undue influence and persuasion of
her doctor brother, her attending physician and the social
workers with whom she consulted.
Undue influence is not clearly defined by the courts
and is largely determined by the circumstances of each
particular case. (2 Am. Jur. 2d, ADOPTION, Section 35)
A commonly accepted test, however, seems to be whether
or not the full agency of the person influenced was taken
from him or destroyed, and in its place the will of another
person substituted. (Ibid., Section 36.) It seems abundantly
clear from the record that Plaintiff, at the time she signed
the agency Release, was not exercising her full agency, but
rather substituting the will and desire of her doctor and
the agency representative. There is no evidence that she
ever unequivocally expressed her desire to release the
child. Up to the very minute she signed her name, as directed, she was upset and undecided regarding the matter
and apparently signed only as one defeated by the circumstances and resigned to the wishes of others - "I might as
well," she said.
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Neither the doctor, nor the social worker held a gun
or threatened physical violence, but undue influence is
ordinarily not the subject of and is seldom established by
direct influence; rather it is usually established by proof of
a collection of facts and circumstances from which an inference of undue influence may be drawn. ( Ibid., Section
47) It is a much more subtle influence than gun or club,
but equally deadly.
It is obvious that Plaintiff was unusually amenable to
influence because of her mental and physical condition.
This peculiar susceptibility to influence, together with the
confidential relationship existing between herself, and the
doctor, and herself and the social worker, creates a presumptive inference of undue influence. (Ibid., Sections 37,
47) This being the case, Defendant had a burden of rebutting such a presumption, and going forward with persuasive evidence that Plaintiff was in fact not unduly persuaded to the action taken. None of the confidants involved
gave any enl'.ouragement or assistance in relation to keeping
the baby. Though Mrs. Stewart apparently explained the
mechanics of adoption and the help available in relation
thereto, she failed to explain help available should Plaintiff
keep the baby. "She didn't ask this so I didn't offer it.
There wasn't any time where we reached that point in
counselling." (R. 104). It is obvious and so stated that the
doctor and social workers felt adoption the right action to
take and in the best interests of all concerned. No one
questions their right to such judgment, nor perhaps their
right to express and suggest same, but the question becomes,
how far and in what degree are they justified in urging
such judgment. At what point does their thinking translate,
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superimpose upon and become the thinking of the mother?
In this case that point came and their will became substituted for Plaintiffs to the point where she did not fully
and voluntarily make up her own mind regarding perhaps
the most important decision of her life.
Plaintiff's consent was taken within 24 hours of the
birth of her baby, by a person predetermined that this was
the thing to do and who had already made arrangements
and committments for the placement of the child, while
plaintiff was extremely upset emotionally, physically impaired in both mind and judgment, still within the influence,
confinement and atmosphere of doctor and hospital, and
without the impartial advice of a judge as to the significance and legal consequences of her act. In this light one
shudders at the legislative preference given to an agency
adoption in so far as the rights of the natural parent are
involved. We wonder as to why the distinction between
agency and non-agency in the matter of consent and tend to
agree with ,Justice Henroid as to the meaninglessness of
such destinction. (See concuring opinion, Taylor, et al vs.
Waddaups, et u;i:, 121 Utah 279, 241 P 2d 157 (1952) ) . The
reason for the distinction is, of course, because the Legislature has made the distinction. But it being so, and dangerously so, it behooves this Court, as is suggested by
Justice Callister in Thomas vs. Children's Aid Society of
Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P 2d 1029, ( 1961), to make a
careful review of the record as to duress or coercion.
b. The Finding enunciated by the District Judge, in
addition to negating any undue influence, finds that Plaint.iff had full knowledge of the nature and consequences of
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her act. We submit this conclusion was also specifically in
error and that a finding directly to the contrary is supported
by the facts.

At the moment of truth when the Release form was
signed, only one other person was in the presence of Plaintiff; to-wit, Mrs. Stewart. (We attach little significance to
the signing of the Hospital Release form three days later
on December ~1, since this was signed by Plaintiff after the
fact, when fully aware of her previous signature and as a
routine matter with little significance. (R. 152) ) Mrs.
Stewart found Plaintiff responsive and able to fill in the
necessary forms as directed. Though apparently a competent social worker with many years of experience, she
was neither doctor, nurse, nor expert in the field of psychological response. She made no attmpt to ascertain the
patients' condition (R. 101) but entered the room unannounced. Whether patient was sitting up or lying down,
she isn't quite sure (R. 97, 105) but she knows Plaintiff
signed the papers which were brought for that purpose. She
doesn't remember much that was said during the 30 minutes
she spent in the room, but she specifically remembers what
she did not say to brother Bill as she left the room. (R. 107)
She does remember that when she left the room Plaintiff
was crying. She can't remember previous discussions with
Plaintiff about the time for taking the consent, but she
can remember that on the afternoon after surgery she
called and announced her visit scheduled for the next day.
If she did call, no wonder Plaintiff, heavily sedated directly after the delivery of a child by Caeserian section,
doesn't remember the conversation.
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Mrs. Stewart's memory, being as it is, one wonders
what really happened during that one half hour visit. What
was said, how did Plaintiff react and respond, specifically?
The fact that Plaintiff was able to read a paper, fill in the
blanks and sign her name just as instructed, seems to us of
little consequence. A six year old child could do as much.
But did she know what she was doing, did she understand
the significance thereof?
Dr. Hebertson, from his own testimony and the record,
did not see Plaintiff from 8 a.m. to 6 :10 p.m. on that fateful day. She had no history of reaction to narcotics so he
had no reason to suspect any unusual behavior on her part.
But he did not see her, and he did not know her mental state
at 2 :30 p.m. Unlike Dr. Clark, a psychiatrist, teacher at
the University of Utah medical school, and expert in the
field of psycho-pharmacology, who hesitated to testify regarding obstetrics (R. 79), Dr. Hebertson, an obstetrician,
with no special training regarding drugs and their effect,
didn't hesitate to testify about the effect of drugs.
Nor was nurse Jerominski a psychiatrist or one trained
in the effect of drugs. All she knew really was that Plaintiff
was a nice, cooperative, patient who seemed to know what
she was doing. Bill and Barbara, however, who knew their
sister much better than the others mentioned, found her
behavior to be very unlike her normal self; not just that
she was emotional and crying, but that she seemed as in
a trance and unable to converse with them in her usual way.
Barbara spent two hours with Plaintiff prior to the signing
of the consent. Her description of Plaintiff's behavior would
seem very critical.
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We submit that the only competent expert testimony
concerning whether or not Plaintiff had full knowledge of
the nature and consequences of her act came from Dr.
Clark. Dr. Clark considered the following factors:
(I) Repeated questions by Plaintiff as to time of day.

(R. 78, 82)

(2) Inability of Plaintiff to respond to conversations
with Bill and Barbara. (R. 78)
(3) The rolling of her head from side to side. (R. 77)
( 4) Sleep deprivation. (R. 79)
(5) Spotty memory loss. (R. 90)
(G) After-effects of major surgery. (R. 79)
(7) Inconsistency in spontaneous signing of name.

(R. 80)

(8) Recent and cumulative dosages of narcotic drugs.

(R. 78)

On the basis thereof he concluded that Plaintiff was
under an organic fussional state, an acute brain syndrome,
(R. 78) and that he would have questions about her competency and her ability to weigh the evidence or the significance of her decision because of the presence of impaired
brain function. (R. 80, 83) This, as he explained, would
not render her unable to fill in the blanks of a document,

18
or sign her name. (R. 84) She could even carry on a
meaningful conversation. ( R. 85) She could do all these
things even voluntarily, but still be under the influence of
a disordered state of mind. (R. 88) In spite of incessant
cross examination he persisted in his testimony that it
was highly probable that organic impairment was present.
(R. 85) About all counsel for Defendant could wring from
Dr. Clark was an agreement to the meaningless proposition:
if Plaintiff was normal - she was normal, a conclusion
which, as the court pointed out, would be testified by any
doctor. (R. 89, 90)
The circumstances in this case are much less extrem1~
than have supported a finding of undue influence in other
jurisdictions. In the case of Hammond vs. Chadwick, Tex.
Civ. App., 199 SW 2d 547 (1947), a married woman discovered she was pregnant while her husband was overseas,
obviously by another man. The mother wrote her husband
of this circumstance and he replied explaining that he was
somewhat shocked and suggesting they place the child for
adoption, to which she subsequently agreed. Prior to the
birth of the baby a solicitious neighbor lady offered to adopt
the baby when born, telling the mother that if she kept the
baby it would cause trouble with her husband and she
wouldn't have a happy home. Four days after the birth of
the baby the mother returned home from the hospital and
the baby was taken home by the neighbor lady. On the
same day the mother, and father, who had returned home
from overseas, signed a consent agreement in the presence
of the neighbor lady and her lawyer. A petition for adoption was filed next morning. Two and one-half months after
signing the consent, the mother filed her objection in the
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adoption proceeding claiming, among other things, that her
consent was not freely given. The trial court granted the
adoption, but the appellate court, after reviewing the evidence, concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show
that the instrument was freely executed, for at the time
the mother executed same " ... she was laboring under a
great mental strain and in fear that if she kept the child
it would result in unhappiness to her family and cause a
separation between herself and her husband." (p. 551) We
are, of course, dealing in degrees of duress, but certainly
our instant case, involving an unwed mother subject to
pressures from both family and doctor with problems of
support and social ostricism, presents a more extreme case
of "mental strain".
In the case of Allen vs. Morgan, 75 Ga. App. 738, 4·1
E 2d 500 (1947), a child was born three months after a
couple were married. The stepmother-in-law suggested that
the baby be placed for adoption because her social standing
was at stake. A month after the baby was born it was
placed with a doctor who subsequently placed it with
another family and a month later a consent to adoption was
signed. Five months later the natural parents intervened
in an adoption proceeding seeking return of the baby. The
trial court denied the adoption and the adopting parents
appealed. There was no allegation that any force or duress
was used at the time the consent was signed. As a matter
of fact the mother admitted she was willing to have the
child adopted at that time. However, she claimed she did
so under the pressure from her mother-in-law. The trial
court found that the natural parents were suffering from
" ... intense mental distress, which while not induced by the
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petitioning parties, was of sufficient force to prevent them
from freely exercising their own judgments, over the disposition of their child which was their most precious possession." The appellate court affirmed, stating that not
only did the evidence justify the trial court decision, but
that if a trial court finds a consent is not freely and voluntarily given " ... it is its duty to deny the adoption." In its
decision the court made the following significant comments:
"Furthermore the contract of adoption is absolutely
irrelevant and immaterial in an adoption case other
than on the question of consent . . . If consent not
embodied in a contract can be inquired into by the
court and found not to exist if induced by the duress
of anyone, it may do so where the consent is embodied in a contract, and this because the contract
is relevant so far as consent is concerned."
In this case ''intense mental stress" prevented the natural
parents from freely exercising their own judgment. The
analogy to our instant case is obvious.
In the case of In re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa. 78, 69
A 2d 132 ( 1949), a child, Timothy was born out of wedlock on July 8, 1947. The natural mother lived with her
mother and seven brothers. Her brothers, upon becoming
aware of her pregnancy were incensed and openly resented
her presence in the home. They called her names and suggested an abortion be performed. They accused her of
being the cause of her mother's death, who died January,
1948. After the birth of the baby the mother left it with
various friends and relatives. Eventually, in February,
1948, it came into the possession of petitioners and on
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March 27, 1948 the mother signed an "irrevocable" consent to its adoption. However in August she filed an answer
to the Petition for Adoption and simultaneously filed a Writ
of Habeas Corpus for the return of the child. She alleged
that at the time she signed the consent she was confused
because of her mother's recent death and "induced by the
duress and undue influence of her seven brothers to deliver
up the custody of the child." The trial judge found that the
mother signed the consent under "unsurmountable duress
and coercion". The appellate court affirmed, and in so
doing said:
"The affection respondent manifested for her child,
the pressure under which she consented to give up
the custody of the infant, together with the fact
that within three months she sought its return,
clearly controvert proof of an intent to abandon."
Finally, we cite the case of Karr us. Wilke, Executive
Director of the Nachusa Lutheran Horne for Children, et al,
30 Ill. App. 2d 361, 174 N E 2d 897 (1961) which seems
almost on all fours with our present case, except that our
present case seems a much more aggravated situation. In
the following report we have underscored the significant
comparisons and contrasts with our instant case.
A habeas corpus proceeding was filed by a natural
mother to obtain custody of her inf ant child from a licensed
child welfare agency and the adoptive parents. The circuit
court quashed the writ and remanded custody to the adoptive parents and the natural mother appealed.
The natural parents were young marrieds afraid that
they could not care for the expected baby, their first. In
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this frame of mind they visited the defendant agency and
were advised that their only alternative, in fairness to the
child, was to place it for adoption. The birth was an uneventual one. The consent of the mother was taken by the
agency worker in the hospital approximately 96 hours,
or 4 days, after the birth. She walked to a room in the hospital where she signed the papers. The mother left the hospital without the child and without ever seeing the child.
The mother filed for the writ four months almost to the day
from the date of birth. (Incidentally, the matter wasn't
heard by the appellate court until 14 months later.)
In her complaint the mother did not question the form
of the surrenders or consents and admitted signing same,
but alleged (1) that at the time of signing she was under
the influence of drugs, in a weakened mental and physical
condition, emotionally unstable, recovering from the effects
of her first child birth, and by reason thereof was unable
to comprehend the significance of her act, and (2) that she
was misinformed as to the nature and effect of the instrument which she signed and believed she could reacquire
custody of the child. The defendant, among other things,
claimed that the petitioner's surrender or consent was irrevocable.
The appellate court reviewed the record, reversed the
trial court, and returned the baby to the natural mother.
The appeal court found the mother was not under the influence or effect of drugs or medications but specifically
recognized that ". . . the time and place of the signing
thereof and her then physical condition, which was obviously
weakened and not normal, are material, relevant facts and
circumstances bearing on the ultimate question of fact."
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Reversal was made primarily on the grounds that because
of concealment by her husband and the agency worker, she
did not understand or comprehend the final effect of the
consent instrument, but the other considerations herein
mentioned obviously influenced the court. We do not suggest
that an element of misrepresentation exists in our instance case, but suggest that the same rule will apply, viz,
that under the pressures, influences and circumstances
Plaintiff did not know or adequately understand the drastic
nature of her act in signing the paper as directed.
The court in the Karr case, supra, was obviously influenced by certain considerations which we think should
be equally influential on this Court. Apparently in that
case, as in the instant case, concern was expressed as to
the attachment of the adopting parents. In regard thereto,
the court stated :
"The respondents have no vested interest in the
child, and, the petition herein having been filed ...
less than four months after the birth of the child,
they had little or no opportunity of developing love,
affection, and attachment for the child, or the child
for them. The petitioner acted reasonably promptly
to try and obtain the child back." (Emphasis added)
The court was also troubled in that case, as I believe
this court should be in this case, with the urgency of the
placement agency in securing the release. In our case the
consent was taken just 24 hours after an eventful, major
surgical process while the Plaintiff was under the effect of
drugs, physically weakened and emotionally upset. Though
the circumstances were not nearly so extreme, that court
nonetheless said,
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"It is not without significance that this purported
surrender or consent was taken ... barely 96 hours
or possibly less, after the birth of the child." (Emphasis added)
That court then goes on to refer to a newly adopted Illinois
statute not yet in effect at that time precluding the taking
of consents within 72 hours of birth, and makes great fuss
that the period actually involved was only 24 hours beyond
that which the new statute would set as a minimum. Mrs.
Stewart indicated it was a common practice for her agency
to take consents within 24 hours of birth. We submit that
in any case, and as a matter of law, this is too soon, and
that the Defendant Agency should change its ways. Even
the three or four days which Mrs. Stewart promised Plaintiff would in some cases be too soon. Every practicing attorney knows that in a non-agency case where presence in a
down-town court before an impartial judge is required, a 24
hour period would be impossible.
As the court found in the Illinois case, we urge in this
case that under the circumstances the decision of the trial
court was against the manifest weight of the evidence and
the law.

POINT III.
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF KNOWINGLY
AND VOLUNTARILY EXECUTED SAID RELEASE PREDETERMINED THAT THIS WAS
THE COURSE OF ACTION SHE WOULD TAKE
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It was established early in the jurisprudence of this
state and is an established rule that the trial court should
not make findings of fact where there is no evidence to
support them, and if it does so judgment influenced thereby
will be reversed. In Hathaway vs. Mines, 42 Utah 520, 132
P. 388 (1913) this court stated:

"The finding of facts and entering of judgments are
solemn acts, and no court should permit itself to
make a finding of fact where the record is conclusive ... that there is absolutely no evidence to
support such finding."
There is absolutely no evidence in the record, aside
from a self-serving statement by Dr. Hebertson (R. 127),
that Plaintiff had predetermined to release her child for
adoption. The evidence is that the first demand of placing her baby for adoption was made to Plaintiff by her
brother doctor. Dr. Hebertson repeated the advice and
referred Plaintiff to Miss Bridgewater.
Plaintiff had one conversation with Miss Bridgewater
before the birth of the baby. ( R. 144, 14 7) This was four
months before the birth of the baby. (R. 144) Miss Bridgewater made an appointment for Plaintiff with Mrs. Stewart.
She met with Mrs. Stewart on one occasion, (R. 92) and
filled out a preliminary heritage record (R. 93). This was
approximately three months before the birth of the child
and she did not see Mrs. Stewart again until after the birth
of the child. Even though apparently both ladies recommended adoption there is no evidence that Plaintiff unequivocally committed herself to either lady in relation thereto.
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Obviously as an unwed mother, badgered by her
brother, influenced by her doctor, advised by the social
workers, and concerned about money, she considered the
possibility of adoption. But the evidence is that right up to
the very day she signed the consent she had not made up her
mind and was in doubt. Ten minutes before Mrs. Stewart
entered her room unannounced and unexpected, Plaintiff,
in her at least semi-rational moments, said, to her sister,
"Barbara, I don't know. I just don't know if I can give
it up. I don't know. I don't know." (R. 63) This doesn't
sound like the calm and deliberate statement of a person
predetermined to a course of action. Brother Bill called
at the hospital on that fateful day for the very purpose of
attempting to influence a decision yet to be made. (R. 69)
We submit that there had been no decision nor was there
ever any decision, except under pressure in a half delerious
state, to relinquish custody of a child she wanted so badly.

POINT IV.
THAT UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ADDUCED PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT
TO REVOKE OR WITHDRAW ANY CONSENT
GIVEN
It was a conclusion of law by the District Judge that
Plaintiff had no right to revoke or withdraw her consent
to the adoption of her minor child. (R. 27) We submit this
was an error of law made by the trial judge.
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a. The question of "right to revoke consent" is not a
new one before this court. It has been considered in at least
three significant cases ; but of course, never within the context of the facts and circumstances of the instant case. There
follows a synthesis of these past cases, applying the rules
laid down therein to our present situation.
In the case of Taylor vs. Waddoups, et ux, supra, an
agreement was made on March 1, 1950 that defendants
would adopt four of plaintiff's children and custody was
transferred thereto. On March 9, 1950, plaintiff and husband signed a "Consent to Adoption" which was subsequently filed in the district court on January 5, 1951. On January
8, 1951, the district court signed an order of adoption. Plaintiff secured a Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 26, 1951,
nearly a year after signing the consent, and on April 22 the
court granted plaintiff's motion to vacate the order of adoption. The habeaus corpus and adoption cases were consolidated for trial and the court awarded one child to plaintiff
and three children to defendants. On appeal this court reversed and returned custody to the plaintiffs, the natural
parents.

There was no question as to whether or not the consent
was freely given, but the court held it was not a legal consent
because taken before a notary public, rather than before a
judge as required by law.
Of more importance, as that case bears on the instant
case, than Justice Wolfe's language in the majority opinion,
are comments made by two concurring judges. Justice Wade
said,
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"I concur on the ground that plaintiff had effectively
revoked her consent to the adoption of these children
before it was consumated, and there was no showing
that she had deserted them."
Justice Henroid said,
"I concur in the result only-for two reasons: ( 1)
that the purported order of adoption violated Title
14-4-14 U.C.A. 1943, having been entered before the
children had lived for one year in the home of the
purported adopting parents, and (2) that priur to
the filing of the petition for adoption the natural
muther effecti1)ely revoked any consent to adoption
that she may have given, a right generally conceded
under the authorities, when applied to the facts of
this case." (Emphasis added)
Technically the case stands only for the proposition
that an adoption decree can be reversed where there was no
legal consent. But the concurring opinions recognize and
confirm a "right to revoke"-by one justice at any time
prior to consumation of the adoption, and by one justice at
any time prior to the filing of the petition, under the facts
of the case. Unfortunately, Justice Henroid didn't specify
the facts he felt controlling. But in any event the "right to
revoke" was recognized.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Henroid also discusses at some length the technicality of requiring "physical
presence" before the court in a non-agency adoption and
points out the shallowness of distinguishing an agency adoption from a non agency adoption in relation to consent. We
have already endorsed and urged these same sentiments
regarding agency adoptions.
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In defense of the "physical presence" requirement,
Chief Justice Wolfe, in the majority opinion does, however,
make a very persuasive argument. He says:
"The purpose of this requirement is that the court,
representing the public, can see that the parents
when they consent to the adoption of their children
are inf o1'med and fully understand the effect of the
act which they are performing. The court should
endeavor to protect the parents from fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence in the obtaining of
their consent. Oft times, consents of adoption are
signed by parents while under great emotional
strain, and, as in this case, they may be signed while
the parent is suffering from discouragement and dispair. To conduce the welfare of all concerned, this
safeguard is established as an assurance that the
parents have duly considered the consequence of
their act. The Legislature has deemed this contract
to be of too great importance to permit it to be signed
before a notary public without the benefit of consultation with, and supervision by a court." (Emphasis
Added)
This reasoning further points up the absurdity of the
agency distinction-because after all, the agency worker is
likewise nothing more than a notary public. If it is important that the natural parents be fully informed and fully
understand the effect of their act and be protected from undue influence when under great emotional stress in a nonagency case, why not equally so in an agency case?
Justice Wolfe likewise seemed impressed by the fact
that Plaintiff made a diligent attack on the voidable adoption decree; to-wit, 48 days later, though actually one year
after signing a consent and releasing custody of children.
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It seems to us a fortiori that if this Court returned the
children in the Taylor case, the same result should apply in
the instant case. The Taylor case dealt with four children
who had been in an adoptive home for over a year before
efforts to recover were made. In our case the child had been
in an adoptive home for less than a month before such effort
was made. In the Taylor case there was no question of a voluntary consent, that issue being resolved on a legal technicality. In our case there is a very real question as to the state
of mind when the consent was given. The return of the children in the Taylor case on a technicality and a refusal to do
so in the instant case where very real issues of consent are
concerned would seem like swallowing the proverbial camel
and saving the gnat.

Less than one year after the Taylor case, the case of In
re Adoption of D. - - - - - -, 122 Utah 525, 252 P 2d 229

(1953), was decided by this Court. In that case the natural
mother did in fact sign a consent to adoption before a judge,
and some 14 months after the placement of the child, and
four months after the filing of the adoptive petition, attempted to revoke the consent and recover the child.
The evidence indicated that directly after the birth of
the child the mother placed the child with relatives and
showed little interest in the child for some two years. Nonetheless, Plaintiff urged that she had the arbitrary right to
revoke her consent at any time before the completeion of the
adoption proceedings.
Obviously influenced by the facts of the case and, in the
interest of the child, this Court affirmed the district court
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and held that plaintiff could not revoke her consent. Interestingly enough, however, the court did not, though it had
the opportunity to do so, flatly reputiate the "right to revoke" concept. Rather, this Court said by Justice Crockett
that a consent freely and knowingly given cannot be
arbitrarly revoked. The court stated the question and gave
its answer as follows :
"This question is presented: Does a parent who has
appeared before a court in connection with an adoption proceeding and voluntarily consented to the
adoption of her child, have the right, arbitrarly and
without cause, to revoke her consent, when as here
the adoptive parents have accepted the child, kept it
in their home for a considerable period of time so
that mutual affections have developed, gone to the
trouble and expense in providing care and in making
a home for said child and have in all respects satisfied the 1'equirements of the law as to adoptive parents? Our answer is that under these circumstances
she has not such arbitrary right." (Emphasis added)
The court then goes on to acknowledge that reading of
many cases teaches that each depends upon its own facts.
The court specifies such facts which we herewith set out,
applying each to our particular case:
1. The circumstances of the placement of the child :

No application in present case.

2. The circumstances under which consent was given: Highly questionable in present case.
3. The length of time the adopting parents have had
the child : Minimal in present case.
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4. Any "vested rights" that have intervened: None
in present case.

5. Welfare of the child: No question that natural
mother would be fit mother.
6. Character of respective claimants: No question
regarding Plaintiff.
7. Diligence of natural parent in seeking return. In
our case just 8 days after releasing child.
Although not involving an agency adoption, the court
was also obviously influenced by, and referred to the
provisions of Section 55-10-42 U.C.A. 1953, which provided:
"No parent ... who by instrument of writing surrenders ... the custody of a child to any childrens
aid society ... shall thereafter ... be entitled to custody or control ... (of) ... any such child ... "
This irrevokable agency consent statute was repealed
by our legislature (Laws of Utah 1965, Chapter 165) and is
no longer the law in this jurisdiction. It should have no influence on the determination of the instant case. In any
event and regardless of its repeal, the Court, in referring
to said statute and being influenced thereby, recognized
that the individual circumstances will prevail even in an
agency adoption and in spite of such statute by saying:
"We are not here called upon to say whether under
all circumstances this would prevent a revocation of
a consent given to such an agency.''
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The D. - - - - - - case is obviously distinguishable on several facts from our instant case. Nonetheless, we submit and
subscribe to the general rule enunciated therein; to-wit, that
consent freely and voluntarily given cannot be arbitrarily
revoked after adoption proceedings have been commenced,
relying upon this case as further recognition by this court
of the right to revoke and authority for revocation under the
circumstances of the case.
In the case of Miller vs. Miller 8 Utah 2d 290, 333 P. 2d
945 ( 1959), the court again refused to allow revocation of
consent given in the presence of counsel and judge after a
petition for adoption had been filed. However, the court,
restating the ruling of the D. - - - - - - case in a positive way
that a consent, even though freely and voluntarily given,
could be withdrawn for good cause, recognized that:
"Fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake and want
of understanding might present a situation where
the consent should be withdrawn ... "
The court in this case was also influenced by the fact
that the consent to adoption had been acted upon by the
adopting parents in that they had filed their petition for
adoption and incurred certain financial obligations.
b. What appears to be the prevailing rule regarding the
right to revoke, or at least the "trend" of the decisions is
expressed as follows :
" ... where a natural parent has freely and knowingly given the requisite consent to the adoption of his
or her child, and the proposed adoptive parents have
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acted upon such consent by bringing adoption proceedings, the consent is ordinarily binding upon the
natural parent and cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn
as to bar the court from decrees of adoption, particularly where, in reliance upon such consent, the proposed adoptive parents have taken the child into
their custody and care for a substantial period of
time and bonds of affection, in the nature of a 'vested
right' have been forged between them and the child."
(Emphasis added. 156 ALR 1011 (1945) )
This rule and situation was specifically quoted and
adopted by this court in the case of In re Adoption of
D. - - - -. (supra) (See also 2 CJS ADOPTION, p. 386, para-

graph 4; 2 Am Jur 2d ADOPTION, Section 46) The annotation cited (156 ALR 10, 11) further states:
"On the whole, however, it can be said from the
cases generally that the question whether a natural
parent may effectively revoke previously given consent so as to bar the granting of an adoption decree
usually depends upon all circumstances of the particular case, including such a variety of matters as
the terms of the particular adoption statute-which
may, expressly or by clear implication control the
solution of the situation; the circumstances under
which consent was given; the length of time elapsing,
and the conduct of the parties between the giving of
consent and the attempted withdrawal; whether the
withdrawal of consent was made before or after the
institution of adoption proceedings; the nature of the
natural parent's conduct with respect to the child
both before and after consenting to its adoption ; and
the 'vested rights' of the proposed adoptive parents
with respect to the child." (Authorities Cited)

35
c. We call specific attention to the consideration as to
whether or not the withdrawal of consent is attempted before the institution of the adoption proceedings. In all of the
Utah cases as hereinabove cited, revocation was attempted
after the adoption proceedings had been instituted. Our
court apparently has not been faced with the specific situation where a revocation is attempted before the adoption
proceedings are commenced. The only authority in this regard is the concurring opinion of Justice Henriod in the
Taylor case (supra) wherein he concurs with the majority
on the grounds that the natural mother had effectively revoked her consent prior to the filing of the petition for
adoption ..
The question arose at the trial of this matter as to when
the adoption proceeding had actually commenced. Counsel
for Defendant Agency, took the position that the proceeding
commenced upon the placement of the child in the home of
third persons for adoption. In this regard, we refer the court
to the case of In re Trimble's Adoption, 16 U. 2d 188, 398 P.
2d 25 ( 1965). In that case, which tested the custody right of
a natural father, and involved a jurisdictional question as to
respective authority of the district court vs. the juvenile
court in custody matters, Justice Callister forthrightly
stated:
"An adoption proceeding is commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the district court." (See
also Section 78-30-7 UCA 1953)
This, of course, makes sense and is the right approach
since there is no common law adoption. In this country the
right or power to create by legal proceeding the relationship
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of parent and child between persons not so related by nature
exists only by virture of a statutory provision describing the
conditions and procedure by which adoption may be made
effective. (2 Am. Jur. 2d ADOPTION, Section 2) Until a
petition is filed, the court has no jurisdiction to judically
terminate parental rights in regard a child, the only issue
being where a contest arises during said time, such as in the
instant case, that of the custody and control of the child. Up
until such proceedings are instituted and the jurisdiction of
the court invoked, the natural parent may, with or without
cause, revoke his consent since any prior release of custody
by the natural parent is in and of itself against public policy
and a contract for that purpose is specifically unenforceable.
This rule is set forth and explained in the case of French vs.
CathoUc Comrnunity League, 69 Ohio App. 442, 44 NE 2d
113 (1942). This was a habeas corpus proceeding by one
alleging himself to be the father of a certain illegitimate
child to obtain its custody. The issue was whether or not the
child's mother, after having surrendered the child into the
permanent custody of a child placing agency for adoption,
could withdraw that consent before a public body had acted
upon such consent. The court stated,
" ... it is well recognized in some of such instances
that have reached judicial attention that the individual may withdraw a consent and approval at any
time before the public body acts thereon."
The court argues :
"Keeping in mind the paramount thought for the
child's welfare ... we ask ourselves 'Why should such
an unfortunate mother be permitted to revoke her
prior consent for relinquishment when she has not
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been advised as to its acceptance and it has not yet
been acted upon?' She might have given it up in contemplation of death and thereafter made recovery.
She may have been destitute and shortly thereafter
acquired an inheritance and an ability to care for her
offspring. Must she adopt her own child? Surely she,
being a suitable person, it would have been a cruel
society devoted to the welfare of children as is the
appellee, to say you cannot reclaim your given word
and have back your child."
That this type of release is voidable, is verified in the
case of Skaggs vs Cannon, 293, Ky. 795, 170 S.W. 2d 12
( 1943).
The rule is normally stated in the converse, to-wit.
"That a freely given consent is not arbitrarily revocable
where adoption proceedings have been instituted thereto."
(See 138 ALR 1038) But, of course, this necessarily implies
that the reverse is equally true, to-wit: That a consent to
adoption is arbitrarily revocable before it has been acted
upon by the institution of adoption proceedings.
We submit, therefore, (1) that the natural mother has
the right to revoke a consent, though freely given, with or
without cause if not acted upon by the institution of adoption
proceedings, and (2) that a natural mother has the right to
revoke a consent even after the adoption proceedings have
been commenced if (a) the consent was not freely and voluntarily given with full knowledge and understanding of
the consequences thereof, or (b) for other good cause, taking
into consideration the circumstances enumerated in the
D. - - - - - - and Miller cases as herein before summarized.
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The significance of our argument is that this court has recognized the right to revoke, saying only that it cannot be
arbitrarily exercised after the consent has been acted upon.
This, of course, is the direct antithesis of the position urged
by defendants' counsel at the time of the trial to the effect
that there is no right to revoke and that the only issue in a
custody contest where placement has been made with an
agency is whether or not the release was freely and voluntarily given, and the release in the first instance valid or
invalid. To follow defendant's line of reasoning, makes of
the agency more than simply a vehicle for the placement of
children and puts the agency in the roll of a pseudo-natural
parent with rights, once it has obtained custody of a child,
to hold or otherwise dispose thereof. What if, in the instant
case, the child had not been immeditely placed in a home, or
what if the home was unsuitable or for any other reason an
adoption proceeding was neither instituted nor concluded?
Does the child-placing agency then become a permanent
home with judicial rights in and to said child without the
institution of adoption proceedings. We remind the court
that a one-year period after the placing of a child in a home
before the adoption becomes final is required. (Section 7830-14 UCA 1953, as amended) It was obviously contemplated by the legislature that there might be situations where the
placing of a child does not necessarily result in the adoption
thereof and this circumstance adds weight to numerous
authorities (See 138 ALR 1038; 156 ALR 1011), supporting
a position that a consent may be revoked at any time up to
the final adoption decree, or even beyond if good cause is
shovm. We do not argue the extension of the arbitrary rules
up to the time of the final adoption decree, recognizing that
in our jurisdiction the D. - - - - - - case has invoked a non-
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arbitrary requirement after adoption proceedings have been
commenced, but we do submit as argued herein that an arbitrary right to revoke does exist up to the time a consent
is acted upon by the institution of adoption proceedings.

d. We recognize the rule that in habeas corpus proceedings involving the custody of a child, the welfare of the child
is, as a general rule, controlling. Walton vs. Koffman, supra
and cases cited therein). In the Walton case, Justice Wade
reviews in some detail the decision of Judge Ellett in the
district court on the facts involved by which certain infant
children were returned to the custody of a natural mother
apparently on the basis of her primary right thereto. He
then reverses the district court and returns the children to
the grandparent. Obviously the Appellate Court, determined
this was the best course of action, nonetheless had great
difficulty in justifying its position, and in the end conditioned the result by stipulating that the award to the grandparents was not necessarily permanent. Much of interest
is said and quoted in the opinion, including the adoption of
previous holdings of this court in relation to the circumstance of an unwed mother, to-wit:

" . . . the testimony is conclusive that the plaintff
(the natural parent) is a morally fit person to have
the care and custody of her child ... is the mere fact
that the plaintiff is unmarried of great importance
in this case? All the authorities are to the effect that
her legal rights are not impaired by that fact."
(Harrison vs. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716)
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In the instant case there was no question as to the fitness and ability of Plaintiff to care for the child ( R. 123),
and so the illegitimacy of the child should have no influence
on the decision in this matter.
In the lt'alton case the court was faced with the perplexing problem as to whether, all other things being equal, the
interests of the child are paramount to the rights of the natural parents thereto. A "compromise" rule was adopted establishing a presumption that it is in the best interest and
welfare of the child to be reared unded the care, custody and
control of its natural parent. The rule is stated as follows:
"We conclude that the determining consideration in
a case of this kind is: what will be for the best interest and welfare of the child. That in determining
this question there is a p1·esumption that it will be
for thE' best interest and welfare of the child to be
reared under the care, custody and control of its natural parent; that this presumption is not overcome
unless from all of the evidence, the trier of the facts
is satisfied that the welfare of the child requires that
it be awarded to someone other than its natural parent Thus the ultimate burden of proof on this question is alicays in favor of the parent and against the
other person." (Emphasis Added)
We submit that there is nothing in the record of this
case nor was there anything stated or argued at the trial to
overcome this presumption; to-wit, that it would be for the
best interest and welfare of the child to be reared under the
care and control of Plaintiff. The Walt on court argued that
this presumption is based on both logic and natural interest,
stating:
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"The common experience of mankind teaches 'that
blood is thicker than water,' that usually there is a
much stronger attachment between a natural parent
and child than is developed between a child and fost<'.r parent, that the natural parent is willing to sacrifice its own interests and welfare for the benefit
of the child much more than is the case Wl' h foster
parents, and that generally the natural parent is
more sympathetic and understanding and better able
to get the confidence and love of its own child than
anyone else. All of these things are especially true of
the natural mother, that these facts should always be
kept in mind throughout the trial and given due
weight along with all the other evidence in the case
in determining what will be for the best interest and
welfare of the child."
If the best interest and welfare of the child is to be the
determining factor in the instant case, we suggest and submit that this Court has no choice but to return custody and
control to the Plaintiff.

e. Finally, we remind the court of its previously expressed concern for the rights of the natural mother. In the
D. - - - - - - case, supra, the court stated:
"In considering the question of duress, we do not
overlook the fact that often a natural parent, partticularly a young mother left alone with the responsibility of a child, because of economic conditions or
other circumstances, in order to avoid shame, embarrassment or hardship to herself or others, or out of
solicitude for the child, may be an easy prey to undue
influence of designing or coniving persons. Therefore, whenever such a charge is made, the Court
should carefully scrutinize the evidence lest an hon-
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est, worthy and well-meaning natural parent be unjustly deprived of her child."
And in the Thomas case (supra.), though plaintiff had
set forth no facts in its brief to support the charge of duress
and coercion, the court nevertheless carefully examined the
record in regard thereto, stating:

"This, because in cases of this nature, an unmarried
mother may be easy prey to undue influences. And,
the evidence must be carefully reviewed to avoid the
mother being unjustly deprived of her child."
This court has recognized the primary right of the natural parent, has recognized the right to revoke consent under
the circumstances of the case, and has waxed eloquent as to
its concern for the protection of the unwed, natural mother.
The instant case seems to comply right down the line with
the circumstances and conditions stipulated by this court as
to justify the revocation of consent. The manifst weight of
the evidence establishes that the Plaintiff in signing the
release did not know the nature of her act and was under
undue influence in relation thereto, which circumstance,
even without any other, justifies revocation of consent and
leaves this court no choice but to return custody of the child.
Certainly this case is a classic one, supporting the revocation
of consent and return of custody. We urge the Court to give
more than mere lip service to the lofty ideals, rules and considerations previously expressed, to reverse the order of the
District Judge and return custody of the infant to its natural
mother.
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POINT V.
THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE REGARDING OR OTHERWISE SUPPORTING ITS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ALLEGING THAT THE CHILD HAD BEEN
PLACED IN A SUIT ABLE AND PROPER HOME
FOR ADOPTION, AND THAT ABSENCE OF A
FINDING ON THIS ISSUE PRECLUDED THE
AWARD OF CUSTODY AND CONTROL TO DEFENDANT AGENCY.
In its answer, Defendant Agency plead as an affirmative defense that the child had been placed by Defendant in
a suitable and proper home for adoption. (R. 11) At the
trial, however, the identity of the parents with whom the
child had been placed was carefully concealed and no evidence whatsoever was introduced as to the suitability of said
home. As indicated in the D. - - - - - - case, the character of
the respective claimants to the child is one circumstance to
be considered by the court in deciding whether or not consent may be revoked. Though the character of the prospective adoptive parents is not critical should the court find in
favor of the natural parent, it is obviously critical if the
court finds in favor of the Defendant.
It is also elementary (See Hathaway case, supra.) that
the findings must be responsive to the issue raised. An issue
as to the suitability of the home in which Defendant Agency
has placed the child was raised by Defendant. Failure to
introduce evidence in relation thereto, if nothing else, justifies a new trial and the district judge erred in refusing
same.
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SUMMARY
In Summary, the Plaintiff's position is as follows:
1. That an inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings regarding custody of children is highly equitable in nature. The
court may review questions of both law and fact and enter
such a decree as justice requires.

2. That the persuasions of an offended brother, and persons in whom a special confidence had been entrusted; towit, her doctor and the social workers, unduly influenced
Plaintiff to sign a release which in fact she never intended,
of her own free will, to do.
3. That at the time Plaintiff signed the Release she was
under the influence of narcotic drugs, under such mental
strain and distress, in such a weakened mental and physical
condition, and so emotionally unstable as to not have full
knowledge and understanding of the nature and consequences of her act.
4. That Plaintiff had never predetermined to release
custody of her child for purpose of adoption.
5. That the Court must be as equally concerned that
Plaintiff understand the consequences of signing her consent before an agency worker as the courts and legislature
are concerned in connection with the signing of such a consent before a judge where no agency is involved.
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6. That Plaintiff had a right to revoke her Release and
consent to adoptive proceedings,
a. arbitrarily, prior to her consent being acted upon
by the institution of adoptive proceedings,
b. for good cause, as shown under the circumstances
of the case, at any time.
7. That there was insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that it would be in the best interest and welfare of
the child to be reared under the care, control and custody of
, Plaintiff.
8. That the failure of Defendant to go forward with
evidence as to the suitability of the prospective adoptive
home precluded a judicial deprivation of the primary right
of Plaintiff as the natural mother.
9. That the courts failure to make findings on issues
raised by the pleadings necessitates, if nothing else, a new
trial.
At the trial of this matter witnesses for the defendant
seemed to feel that the agency involved and its workers were
the ones on trial-the custody of the child was a secondary
concern. Much was said in oral argument by defendants'
counsel about the adverse effect upon placement agencies
and the uncertainty in adoptive procedures which would
result should the trial Judge rule in favor of the Plaintiff.
The trial Judge, by his own admission, was much concerned
about such consequences and no doubt his final judgment
was influenced thereby.
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To this concern we answer : justice in this case, on the
facts of this case, should not be determined by possible consequences under other situations. Though we are critical of
the agency and its workers, this of course was not our real
concern. We were not really talking about agencies or contracts or hospital procedures or doctors practices. We were
talking about a mother, a human being, and her infant child,
blood of her blood and bone of her bone. A woman who has
had one child and perhaps may never have another. A
woman who has fulfilled her God-given destiny, only to see
her accomplishment snatched away by the cruel claws of
social pressure, outraged morality, indignant persons who
felt imposed upon. The adoptive parents may yet adopt another child-a child in fact not wanted, and who needs their
love and care. For Plaintiff this may be paradise lost. We
urge the Court not to compound the social felony perpetrated
upon a woman who aches for the soul she stirred. Why can't
an unwed mother who is good and loves her child raise that
child to be a useful citizen any less than the widowed or the
divorced mother? If there is a cause, a distorted society
dictates same, not God or reason.
Where such good grounds exist both in law and in fact
as in this case, we respectfully urge the Court to reverse the
judgment of the district court.
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